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ABSTRACT 
We consider firms in the context of their business ecosystems and explore how governance 
choices with respect to complementors and distributors shape their competitive behavior—i.e., 
investments in new technologies. We argue that, in addition to creating differences in incentives, 
governance choices play an important role in the firm’s ability to coordinate accompanying 
changes in interdependent activities so as to create value from the new technology. We test our 
predictions in the U.S. healthcare industry from 1995-2006. We examine how hospitals’ 
decisions to invest in new imaging technologies are shaped by their governance modes with 
physicians—key complementors to hospitals, and with managed care organizations (MCOs)—
primary distributors of hospital and physician services. We find that hospitals pursuing alliances 
with physicians are more likely to invest in new technologies than hospitals pursuing arm’s-
length or integrated modes, and the likelihood of investment is increasing in the scope of alliance. 
Finally, hospitals pursuing tapered integration with downstream MCOs are more likely to invest 
in new technologies than hospitals pursuing arm’s-length relationships. Overall, the study argues 
for extending research on organizational forms to explore the link between coordination 
mechanisms and competitive behavior, and to consider such choices in the context of business 
ecosystems. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Scholars in management have shed light on a variety of organizational forms that firms 
use to manage interdependent activities, being explicit about the tradeoffs associated with the 
different modes of organization (e.g., Dyer and Singh, 1998; Harrigan, 1984; Hennart, 1993; 
Mahoney, 1992; Williamson, 1991a).  A large number of empirical studies have examined the 
drivers and performance implications of firms’ governance choices. However, the literature has 
been surprisingly silent on how such choices shape firms’ strategic behavior, an important 
precursor to firms’ performance. Notable exceptions are Armour and Teece (1980), who 
examined how vertical integration affects firms’ investments in R&D, and Mullainathan and 
Scharfstein (2001), who examined how vertical integration affects firms’ investments in 
production capacity. 
An emergent perspective in strategy views a firm’s ability to create and appropriate value 
in the context of its business ecosystem encompassing interdependent activities and value chains 
(Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1998; Porter, 1998; Teece, 2007).  Ecosystems are characterized 
by joint value creation and appropriation among buyers, suppliers, and complementors.  The 
choice of a firm’s organizational form with respect to activities in the ecosystem is among the 
most important choices faced by managers (Iansiti and Levien, 2004; Moore, 1996).  However, 
scholars have yet to systematically explore the implications of organizational forms in the 
context of business ecosystems.  
In this study, we consider firms’ governance choices with respect to activities in the 
ecosystem and explore how such choices shape an important type of strategic behavior — i.e., 
investments in new technologies (e.g., Mitchell, 1989; Mitchell and Singh, 1992). We suggest 
that a firm’s ability to create value from a new technology may depend in part on the 
accompanying changes by actors in the ecosystem, who may need to adapt in order for the new 
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technology to be successfully commercialized (Adner and Kapoor, 2010; Argyres, 1995; 
Rosenberg, 1976; Teece, 2007). In addition, a firm’s ability to appropriate value from the new 
technology will depend on its relative bargaining power over other players in the ecosystem 
(Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1998; Porter, 1980). Drawing on organizational economics and 
strategy literatures, we argue that a firm’s governance mode plays an important role in this 
coordinated adaptation for value creation and competition for value capture. Hence, governance 
mode is important to the firm’s decision to undertake such strategic investments. Our empirical 
context allows us to examine a variety of organizational forms: arm’s-length relationships, 
hierarchies, and hybrid arrangements such as alliances (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Kogut, 1988) and 
tapered integration (Harrigan, 1984, 1986).  In so doing, we are able to explicitly consider 
tradeoffs that firms face with respect to the different forms of organization. 
The context for the study is the U.S. health care industry from 1995 to 2006. We focus on 
three main players that constitute the delivery of health care services — hospitals, physicians, 
and managed care organizations (MCOs). Each of these player’s abilities to create and 
appropriate value from its own resources and capabilities is critically dependent on the other 
players. However, the nature of interdependence between hospitals and physicians is distinct 
from the nature of interdependence between hospitals and MCOs. On the one hand, while 
hospitals provide facilities and staff to diagnose and treat the patients, the physicians are the 
primary source of medical expertise for the diagnosis and the treatment. The service provided by 
the physicians is a complement to the service provided by the hospitals, and hence physicians are 
key complementors to the hospitals (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1998: 12). On the other hand, 
hospitals’ (and physicians’) services are packaged and distributed by MCOs downstream as 
health plans. Hence, while the hospital-physician relationship corresponds to a firm-
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complementor relationship, the hospital-MCO relationship corresponds to a firm-buyer 
relationship.  
We examine a hospital’s decision to invest in new medical imaging technologies, one of 
the critical technological advances that have characterized the health care industry (Burns et al., 
2000).  We focus on two distinct imaging technologies: positron emission tomography (PET) and 
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), which have emerged at different periods in the industry. We 
find that hospitals pursuing alliances with physicians are more likely to invest in new imaging 
technologies than hospitals that either have an arm’s-length relationship or are integrated and 
employ their own physicians. Among hospitals pursuing alliances, the likelihood of investment 
in new imaging technologies is increasing in the scope of the alliance. Finally, hospitals pursuing 
tapered integration with MCOs such that they use both internal and external buyers are more 
likely to invest in new technologies than hospitals pursuing only arm’s-length relationships.   
The results from the study, while limited to a single industry, speak to a few important 
issues in the strategy literature. First, the study contributes to research on firm boundaries by 
exploring the link between organizational forms and strategic behavior. We argue and show that 
when the value created by a firm’s strategic investment is dependent on accompanying changes 
among activities in the ecosystem, the firm’s governance choices with respect to those activities 
will have an important bearing on its ability to coordinate such changes and, hence, on its 
decision to undertake such strategic investments. The finding that hospitals pursuing strategic 
alliances with physicians are more likely to invest in new imaging technologies than hospitals 
pursuing integrated strategies reaffirms the need to consider both the costs and the benefits of 
integration (e.g., Gibbons, 2005). While integration provides control over complementary 
activities and may improve coordination among such activities, it may suffer from reduced 
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incentives, bureaucratic costs, and influence activities (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and 
Moore, 1990; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Williamson, 1975, 1985). Hence, firms may need to 
consider tradeoffs regarding ownership of complementary activities, and evaluate alternative 
hybrid forms that may preserve incentives while allowing for coordinated adaptation 
(Williamson, 1991a). Beyond value creation, we also argue that governance choices may 
influence firms’ bargaining power over other players in the ecosystem and shape value 
appropriation from new technology investments (Harrigan, 1984; Porter, 1980).  This effect was 
most evident from our finding that hospitals pursuing tapered integration with respect to MCOs 
were more likely to invest in new technologies than hospitals pursuing market-based contracting. 
Second, to the best of our knowledge, we believe that ours is the first study in the strategy 
literature that has explicitly considered complementors in examining different types of 
organizational forms and their strategic implications on focal firms. While complements are an 
important part of the firm’s business environment (Brandenburger and Nalebuff; 1998, Moore, 
1993; Porter, 1998; Teece, 2007), surprisingly little systematic research has been done to 
examine their interaction with firm strategies and outcomes.1  We hope that our findings will 
encourage scholars to expand their analysis of organizational forms from activities in the vertical 
chain to also consider complements, so as to develop a better understanding of firm strategies in 
the context of the business ecosystem.  
Third, our result regarding hospitals being more likely to invest in new technologies 
when their alliances with physicians are characterized by broader scope suggests that alliance 
“design choices” among complementors may have important implications for inter-firm 
coordination. Scholars analyzing inter-firm alliances and alliance portfolios within a business 
                                                            
1 Notable exceptions include Gawer and Henderson (2007), Pierce (2009), Ozcan and Eisenhardt (2009) and Adner 
and Kapoor (2010).  
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ecosystem may build on these findings to explore how the design of the alliance rather than its 
existence per se shapes firms’ value creation and appropriation (Aggarwal, Siggelkow and Singh, 
Forthcoming; Agarwal, Croson, and Mahoney, 2010; Khanna, Gulati, and Nohria, 1998). 
Finally, we contribute to the literature on technology adoption by showing that a firm’s 
organizational form with respect to activities in the ecosystem has a significant effect on its 
decision to adopt a new technology. Hence, we add to the factors considered by the adoption 
literature (e.g., Geroski, 2000; Griliches, 1957; Rogers, 1995) by suggesting that the distribution 
of organizational forms in a given industry plays an important role in explaining the pattern of 
new technology adoption.  
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Faced with the opportunity of investing in new technologies, firms face important 
tradeoffs (e.g., Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988; Mitchell, 1989; Mitchell and Singh, 1992). 
On the one hand, investing in the new technology may allow a firm to assert its technology 
leadership and create competitive advantage. On the other hand, given the technological and 
market uncertainty, investing in a new technology may also expose a firm to significant financial 
risk of whether it can profit from the new technology.   
How does a firm’s organizational form with respect to activities in the ecosystem affect 
its propensity to undertake new technology investments? We explore this question by drawing on 
arguments from organizational economics and strategy literatures (e.g., Dyer and Singh, 1998; 
Gibbons, 2005; Harrigan, 1984; Williamson, 1985, 1991). We create our hypotheses in the 
context of a simple ecosystem comprising three distinct activities: a focal activity, a 
complementary activity, and a downstream buying activity.  Hence, the ecosystem comprises 
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focal firms, their key complementors, and downstream buyers. Formally, we follow 
Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1998) in defining a player as a complementor if buyers value the 
focal firm’s product more when they have the other player’s product than when they have the 
firm’s product alone (p. 18). For example, manufacturers of hardware and developers of content 
or software are complementors to each other. A similar relationship also exists between 
providers of online services and payment gateways. We first consider governance choices 
between firms and their complementors. We then consider governance choices between firms 
and their downstream buyers.  
 
Organization of Firms and Complementors 
The literature in organizational economics has suggested some important tradeoffs that 
exist between the market and hierarchy forms of organization  These tradeoffs can be broadly 
categorized along the dimensions of “cost of organization” and “adaptability of organization” 
(e.g., Gibbons, 2005; Williamson, 1991a). The cost of a given organizational form entails the 
intensity of incentives for the respective parties (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 
1990), the bureaucratic costs associated with governance and decision-making (Williamson, 
1975, 1985), and the influence activities in which parties attempt to influence decisions or the 
allocation of resources towards their personal gain (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). Adaptability 
refers to the extent to which two parties can generate a coordinated response to changing market 
and technological circumstances characterized by high levels of uncertainty (Barnard, 1938; 
Williamson, 1991a; 1991b).2 On the one hand, while hierarchy enjoys superiority in adaptability, 
it suffers from a high cost of organization. On the other hand, while market provides high- 
                                                            
2  We note that our treatment of the “cost of organization” excludes transaction costs which we explicitly consider 
within the category of “adaptability of organization.” 
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powered incentives and is not subject to bureaucratic costs or influence activities, it suffers from 
limited adaptability.  
The alliance form of organization exhibits characteristics of a hybrid between markets 
and hierarchies (Borys and Jemison, 1989; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Menard, 2004; Williamson, 
1991a). It provides greater incentives than hierarchies, as partners retain autonomy over their 
tasks and the associated payoffs. It also enables greater adaptability than markets, as cooperating 
partners develop communication channels and codes to facilitate knowledge sharing and 
coordination of interdependent tasks (Doz, 1996; Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Dyer and Singh, 
1998; Gulati and Singh, 1998; Gulati, Lawrence, and Puranam, 2005; Zollo et al., 2002). 
Successful commercialization of a new technology often requires accompanying changes 
in complementary activities within the ecosystem (Adner and Kapoor, 2010; Hughes, 1983; 
Rosenberg, 1976; Teece, 2007).  The commercialization phase of a new technology would entail 
coordinated adaptation by focal firms and complementors, who would need to make mutual 
adjustments in their respective activities during a period of technological and market uncertainty 
(Teece, 2007; Williamson, 1991a).  A focal firm’s ability to create value from a new technology 
would depend on the degree to which it can effectively coordinate accompanying changes among 
complementors. As compared to market, an alliance organizational form, characterized by 
cooperation between parties and the existence of communication channels and codes, is more 
effective in achieving such coordinated adaptation. Hence, firms that have an alliance 
relationship with their complementors would be better positioned to create value from the new 
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technology, and more likely to invest in the new technology than firms that have an arm’s-length 
relationship.3 
 
Hypothesis 1: Firms that have an alliance relationship with their complementors will be 
more likely to invest in a new technology than firms that have an arm’s-length 
relationship.  
 
An important feature of the integrated organizational form is that it facilitates coordinated 
adaptation (Williamson, 1991a). This enhanced adaptability might make an integrated firm more 
likely to invest in a new technology than firms using an arm’s-length or an alliance relationship. 
However, such a prediction would have only considered the benefits while ignoring the costs of 
integration. This would have been inconsistent with the theories of the firm that explicitly 
recognize the need to consider both the costs and the benefits of integration.  For example, 
Grossman and Hart (1986) develop a theory of how common ownership shifts the distribution of 
surplus created by the two complementary parties, creating incentive distortions and resulting in 
underinvestment.  Milgrom and Roberts (1992) develop a theory of how authority in an 
integrated firm results in parties lobbying to influence decision makers for their own personal 
benefit. Such influence activities are costly for an integrated firm, as they lower the quality of 
decision making and divert the attention and effort of parties from more productive activities. 
Finally, Williamson (1975, 1985) describes how internalizing a transaction within a firm creates 
different types of bureaucratic distortions, such as procurement practices that favor internal units 
despite a more profitable external alternative, and persistence tendencies that favor continuation 
of unproductive or obsolete projects.  
                                                            
3 It is certainly plausible that alliance between focal firms and complementors can also help to increase the focal 
firms’ relative bargaining power over downstream buyers. This would increase the value that a firm can capture 
from the new technology and may be another reason that firms that have an alliance relationship with 
complementors will be more likely to invest in a new technology than firms that have an arm’s-length relationship. 
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As compared to an integrated form, an alliance form is relatively free from such 
organizational costs, since focal firms and complementors retain autonomy over their respective 
tasks. An important differentiating feature of a firm-complementor alliance as compared to a 
firm-supplier alliance is that the price mechanism of the market that provides for high-powered 
incentives is likely to be preserved. Compared to a firm-supplier alliance, in which long-term 
contracts and high customer bargaining power can result in suppliers being governed like 
organizational units, resulting in incentive attenuation (Makadok and Coff, 2009; Williamson, 
1991a), a firm-complementor alliance does not necessarily alter the market-based interaction 
between alliance partners and their downstream buyers.  
In summary, firms that have an alliance relationship with complementors are relatively 
free from the organizational costs incurred by integrated firms while retaining their ability to 
achieve coordinated adaptation during the commercialization of a new technology.  Hence, as 
compared to integrated firms, firms that have an alliance relationship with their complementors 
will be more likely to invest in a new technology.4  
 
Hypothesis 2: Firms that have an alliance relationship with their complementors will be 
more likely to invest in a new technology than firms that integrate into the 
complementary activities.  
 
Alliance Scope as a Shift Parameter 
Research on alliances has suggested that the choice of alliance scope is among the most 
important choices considered by partnering firms (e.g., Doz and Hamel, 1998; Khanna et al., 
1998; Oxley and Sampson, 2004). Alliance scope refers to the extent of activities that partners 
                                                            
4 An integrated mode is likely to be superior to an alliance mode for very high levels of adaptation. Hence, it is 
possible that for such extreme cases, the benefits of adaptation may supersede the costs of organization and result in 
integrated firms being better positioned to commercialize new technologies. This requires an important boundary 
condition for our hypothesis—i.e., the level of adaptation associated with the commercialization of the new 
technology is of a “moderate” type. 
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jointly carry out through the alliance as compared to their total set of activities. The broader the 
scope of activities carried out within the alliance, the greater the extent of common benefits that 
alliance partners derive from their relationships (Khanna et al., 1998).  Greater common benefits 
help to align the incentives between partnering firms and facilitate cooperation (Agarwal et al., 
2010; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Khanna et al., 1998).  Broader alliance scope would also make it 
easier for firms to identify and coordinate changes in the interdependent activities that will 
interact with the new technology.  Hence, the broader the scope of alliance between firms and 
complementors, the more effective the firms will be in their commercialization of the new 
technology.  
The combination of hypotheses 1 and 2 suggests that we are proposing an inverted U-
shaped relationship between the firm-complementor organizational form along the market-
hierarchy continuum and the firm’s propensity to invest in a new technology.  We now suggest 
that the scope of the alliance, by affecting the extent of cooperation and coordination, can act as 
a shift parameter for the propensity of firms using the alliance mode to invest in a new 
technology.  Hence, the broader the scope of the alliance between firms and their 
complementors, the greater the likelihood that firms would invest in a new technology.  
 
Hypothesis 3: The broader the scope of the alliance between firms and their 
complementors, the greater the likelihood that firms will invest in a new technology. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates our theoretical framework linking firm-complementor organizational 
form to the firm’s likelihood of investment in a new technology. 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
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Organization of Firms and Buyers 
Finally, we consider how firms’ governance choices with respect to downstream buyers 
will affect their likelihood of investment in new technologies.  Besides the arm’s-length 
relationship, we consider a plural form of governance in which a firm uses both arm’s-length and 
integrated strategies. This form of governance, often referred to in the strategy literature as 
tapered integration (Porter, 1980), has been documented for both upstream activities (Harrigan, 
1986; Jacobides and Billinger, 2006; Parmigiani, 2007; Rothaermel et al., 2006) and downstream 
activities (Dutta et al., 1995; Harrigan, 1986; La Fontaine, 1992; Michael, 2000) in the firm’s 
value chain. 
While tapered integration with respect to downstream buyers is more costly to set up and 
more complex to manage than the pure market form, its benefits include reduced information 
asymmetry that mitigates hold-up hazards, greater bargaining power, and lower demand 
uncertainty (Dutta et al., 1995; Harrigan, 1986; Michael, 2000; Porter, 1980). Compared to full 
integration, tapered integration also limits the dulling of incentives and bureaucratic distortions, 
as firms rely on both internal and external parties for downstream tasks (e.g., Porter, 1980).5 
Firms pursuing tapered integration strategies will face lower risk during the 
commercialization of the new technology, as they have preferred access to their downstream 
buyers. Given that buyers may incur specialized investments to commercialize the new 
technology, tapered integration also reduces the likelihood of hold-ups. Finally, greater 
bargaining power would allow firms using tapered integration strategies to appropriate more 
value from the new technology than firms pursuing market-based strategies. Hence, firms 
                                                            
5 Most of our arguments regarding governance choices of downstream buyers also apply to upstream suppliers. 
However, we focus on the downstream buyers to maintain consistency with our empirical context. 
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pursuing tapered integration with respect to downstream buyers will be more likely to invest in a 
new technology than firms pursuing arm’s-length relationships. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Firms that pursue tapered integration strategies downstream in their 
vertical chains will be more likely to invest in a new technology than firms that pursue 
arm’s-length relationships. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Industry Background 
The context for our study is the U.S. health care industry. We focus on three critical players 
that constitute the delivery of health care services—hospitals, physicians, and managed care 
organizations (MCOs). Our focal firms are hospitals that provide facilities and staff to diagnose 
and treat patients. Physicians are the primary source of medical expertise for the diagnosis and 
treatment. The service provided by the physicians is a complement to the service provided by the 
hospitals, and hence physicians are key complementors to the hospitals (Brandenburger and 
Nalebuff, 1998: 12).  Hospitals’ (and physicians’) services are packaged and distributed by 
MCOs downstream as health plans to end-users. Hence, while the hospital-physician relationship 
corresponds to a firm-complementor relationship, the hospital-MCO relationship corresponds to 
a firm-distributor relationship. The complementary relationship between hospitals and physicians 
has also been acknowledged by Gaynor (2006) in his recent review of research on hospital-
physician relationships in the health care literature. He notes that hospitals and physicians 
depend on each other for creating value and that their respective services are sold downstream to 
the buyers. The simplified schema of the health care delivery ecosystem is shown in Figure 2.  
 
 
 
14 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
 
Managed Care Organization 
The managed care organization (MCO) is a critical player in the delivery of health care 
services. MCOs in a given market package and distribute the services offered by hospitals and 
physicians as health plans.  The emergence of MCOs in the early 1980s was in response to 
significant escalation of health care costs under the traditional fee-for-service system, in which 
patients were billed for each service provided and the claims were reimbursed from insurers. The 
insurers themselves did not play any part in the management of the delivery of services such that 
patients could get a service from any provider and receive a pre-determined reimbursement for 
that service from the insurer. Because of the fragmented nature of the payment and delivery 
functions, health care costs rose rapidly (Weisbrod, 1991).  
MCOs integrated both the delivery of health care services and the payment functions, and 
focused on lowering health care costs while maintaining quality. A key feature of the MCO 
business model was to negotiate low rates with select providers (both hospitals and physicians) 
and to offer a variety of health plans to meet the needs of different market segments. By 
stimulating competition among health care providers in order for them to be considered in the 
network of service providers and by enforcing strict cost controls, especially with respect to new 
and more expensive services, MCOs slowed the rate of increase in health care costs (Teisberg, 
Porter, and Brown, 1994). The emergence of MCOs imposed significant pressure on hospitals 
and physicians to improve their competitive position by lowering their costs and/or improving 
the quality of their services. In addition, hospitals and physicians took steps to increase their 
bargaining power over MCOs in order to receive greater reimbursement for their services. These 
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considerations led to a wave of mergers, acquisitions, and alliances among service providers 
(Bazzoli et al., 2004), as well as hospitals acquiring equity interest in some MCOs (Shortell, 
Morrison, and Hughes, 1989).  
 
Hospital-Physician Governance Forms 
The health care industry provides an ideal context in which to explore the implications of 
firm-complementor governance modes. The context is characterized by a wide variety of 
hospital-physician governance forms that include arm’s-length relationships, alliances with 
varying degrees of scope, and fully integrated organizations in which physicians are employed 
by hospitals (e.g., Burns and Thorpe, 1993; Ciliberto and Dranove, 2006; Cuellar and Gertler, 
2006).  
On the one end of the governance continuum, an arm’s-length relationship between 
hospitals and physicians entail that while physicians have admitting privileges in hospitals, they 
remain independent with respect to contracting with MCOs, administrative tasks, and 
information systems. On the other end of the continuum, an integrated salary model entails that 
hospitals employ their own physicians. 
Besides the arm’s-length and integrated modes, four different types of alliance modes are 
extensively used by hospitals and physicians (AHA, 2009). A key distinguishing factor among 
these hybrid choices is the scope of the activities that are carried out through the alliance 
relationship.  First, the Independent Practice Association (IPA) alliance entails that hospitals and 
physicians pursue joint contracting with MCOs while retaining autonomy over administrative 
tasks and information systems (e.g., Burns et al., 2000; Cuellar and Gertler, 2006). An IPA 
alliance is relatively easy to organize and incurs minimal set-up costs. Second, the Open 
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Physician Hospital Organization (OPHO) alliance is responsible for coordinating administrative 
tasks between hospitals and physicians as well as negotiating and managing contracts with 
MCOs. Third, in the Closed Physician Hospital Organization (CPHO) alliance, physicians are 
exclusively contracted to the hospitals, and the scope of the alliance also extends to coordinating 
care for the patients (e.g., Cuellar and Gertler, 2006).  Finally, the Management Service 
Organization (MSO) alliance emulates most of the features of the CPHO alliance except that the 
joint-venture is also responsible for supporting the services of the physicians through staff and 
equipment. The MSO’s services include office support, purchasing and operation of information 
systems, patient billings and collections, and contract marketing and negotiations (Brown, 1996).  
 
Data 
The primary source of data for the study is the American Hospital Association (AHA), 
which since 1946 has conducted yearly surveys of all registered hospitals in the United States, 
with greater than an 80% response rate (AHA, 2009). Since 1995, AHA has been collecting 
information on the organizational forms used by hospitals with respect to physicians. In this 
study, we use AHA annual survey data from 1995 to 2006, supplemented with information on 
MCOs from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and with county-level 
demographic data from the Census Bureau.   
The AHA database included information on 7,525 hospitals from 1995 to 2006. We 
excluded approximately 8 percent of hospitals that reported multiple governance modes with 
physicians. Following previous studies of technology adoption in the health care industry (e.g., 
Baker, 2001; David, Helmchen, and Henderson, 2009), we also excluded psychiatric, children’s, 
and other specialty hospitals that have distinct business models or do not typically need to invest 
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in the medical imaging technologies that we examine in this study (XXX). The final sample 
consisted of 5,367 hospitals.6  
 
Measures 
Dependent Variable: We examine the hospital’s decision to invest in new medical 
imaging technologies. These technologies have been key drivers of technological advances in the 
health care industry (Burns et al., 2000).  We focus on two distinct imaging technologies that 
have emerged at different periods in the industry.  Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) is a 
diagnostic technology that captures high-resolution images of body tissues to detect anomalies 
such as tumors. While the origins of MRI date back to the early 1970s, its clinical use began 
around 1982.  Positron Emission Tomography (PET) is among the most recent diagnostic 
technologies, commercialized in the early 1990s. PET provides a cross-sectional image based on 
metabolic activity of cells, which enables functional level analysis of body tissues.  Each of these 
imaging technologies constitutes a significant investment for a hospital (Baker, 2001; Teplensky 
et al., 1995). A typical investment in these technologies includes capital expenditure in excess of 
$2 million to purchase the equipment and additional maintenance and personnel costs. As with 
most strategic investments, hospitals face the dilemma of whether and when to invest in these 
imaging technologies. An earlier investment may allow a hospital to position itself as a 
technology leader (Luft et al., 1986) and gain market share over its rivals (e.g., Ho, 2009). 
However, earlier investments are also made under considerable risk regarding the capability and 
the implementation of the new technology, the extent of market demand, and the level of 
reimbursements that the hospital will receive from MCOs (Teplensky et al., 1995).  
                                                            
6 We also performed additional analysis that included data from all 7,525 hospitals and our results were consistent 
with the ones reported in the paper.  
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Figure 3 shows the trend in the percentage of hospitals that have invested in MRI and 
PET technologies from 1995 to 2006. Our dependent variable measures whether a hospital has 
invested in the new imaging technology in a given year.  A hospital is assumed to have invested 
in the new technology during the first year that it reports the technology’s availability in the 
AHA annual survey.   
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
 
In some instances, there was inconsistency in the reported data. A hospital might report 
the technology as available one year but not the next. In other cases, a hospital reported the 
availability of the technology in one year but the data were missing the following year and 
resumed in later years. We tested for the robustness of our findings by following the procedure 
used by Baker (2001). Specifically, in the case of inconsistent data, we used as the year of new 
technology investment the earliest of the first two consecutive years in which the hospital 
reported the availability of the focal technology. For example, when a hospital reported the 
availability of the technology in 1995, 1997, and 1998 but not in 1996, we consider the year of 
investment to be 1997. In the case of missing data, we chose the year of new technology 
investment as the earliest of the first three successive years in which the hospital reported the 
availability of the focal technology. For example, when a hospital reported the availability in 
1995, 1997 and 1998 but the data were missing in 1996, we consider the investment year to be 
1995. The results from these robustness tests were fully consistent with our reported results. 
  
Independent Variables: We measured hospital-physician governance form with dummy 
variables that were coded based on the categories used in the AHA survey. Our base category of 
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governance mode is an arm’s-length relationship between hospitals and physicians in which 
physicians have admitting privileges in hospitals but remain independent with respect to MCO 
contracting, administrative tasks, and information systems. We used a dummy variable to code 
whether the hospital formed an alliance with physicians. The variable, Complementor Alliance, 
took a value of 1 if the hospital used any of the four different types of alliance with physicians – 
Independent Practice Association (IPA), Open Physician Hospital Organization (OPHO), Closed 
Physician Hospital Organization (CPHO) and Management Service Organization (MSO), and 0 
otherwise.  The dummy variable, Complementor Integration, took the value of 1 if the hospital 
reported using an Integrated Salary Model (ISM). 
In order to test the effect of alliance scope, we created separate categories of low, 
medium, and high alliance scope. Our categorization is based on the rank ordering of the extent 
of activities that hospitals and physicians carry out through the alliance as compared to their total 
set of activities (e.g., Khanna et al., 1998). An IPA alliance is characterized by hospitals and 
physicians collaborating on contracting with MCOs while retaining autonomy over 
administrative tasks, information systems, and patient care (e.g., Burns et al., 2000; Cuellar and 
Gertler, 2006). It was categorized as low alliance scope. An OPHO alliance between hospitals 
and physicians not only pursued joint contracting with MCOs but also shared administrative 
services. It was categorized as medium alliance scope. Finally, a hospital that used either a 
CPHO or MSO alliance was categorized as having high alliance scope. In this case, physicians 
are exclusively contracted to the hospital, and the activities underlying the alliance include joint 
contracting with MCOs, sharing of administrative services, and coordinating patient care. While 
CPHO and MSO alliance forms are very similar in their scope, as a test of robustness, we 
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estimated a model that included their separate effects. The coefficients and the significance 
levels were almost identical to the aggregated category.  
A hospital typically works with a number of MCOs that distribute its services. Many of 
these interactions are governed through arm’s-length relationships.  However, several hospitals 
reported as having an equity interest in at least one of the MCOs.7  For example, Sanpete Valley 
Hospital (Mount Pleasant, Utah) has an equity interest in Intermountain Healthcare MCO that 
distributes its services in addition to other independent MCOs such as Altius Healthplans and 
Healthy U.  We used a dummy variable, Buyer Tapered Integration, to identify such hospitals. 
 
Control Variables: We controlled for a number of hospital-level and market-level 
covariates that may affect a hospital’s propensity to invest in a new technology. Consistent with 
the healthcare literature, Hospital Size is measured as the total number of beds. We used dummy 
variables to characterize the hospital as a Medical School Member, Teaching School Member, 
Not-for-Profit, or Government Owned.  The hospital’s Capacity Utilization is measured as the 
ratio of annual inpatient days and the total annual capacity of the hospital, obtained by 
multiplying the total number of hospital beds times 365 (Banker, Conrad, and Strauss, 1986). 
The hospital’s Outpatient Ratio is measured as the ratio of total number of annual outpatient 
visits and the total annual number of inpatient admissions (Ciliberto, 2006). The market-level 
controls include the Number of General Hospitals in the county where the hospital is located and 
Market Concentration, measured as the Herfindahl index of hospital market shares in the county. 
We controlled for the county’s demographic characteristics through Unemployment Rate and Per 
Capita Income.  
                                                            
7 The question in the AHA survey specifically asked for an equity interest in MCO organizations that are associated 
with health maintenance organizations and preferred provider organizations, the two most common forms of 
managed care. 
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Many recent studies in the health care literature have reported that the emergence of 
MCOs in the 1980s has imposed excessive economic constraints on hospitals through lower 
reimbursement rates and strict cost controls. As a result, these studies found that greater market 
penetration of MCOs over traditional insurance organizations have lowered the propensity of 
hospitals to invest in new technologies (e.g., Baker, 2001; Douglas and Ryman, 2003; Mas and 
Seinfeld, 2008). The literature has used different data sources to measure the penetration of 
MCOs in a given geographical market.  For example, some studies have used HMO penetration 
rate (e.g. Baker, 1997) whereas others have used Medicare penetration rate (e.g. Dranove, Simon, 
and White, 1998). There are advantages and disadvantages with each of these data sources 
(Dranove et al., 1998). In this study, we used Medicare managed care penetration rate data 
(Baker, 1997) from the Area Resource File provided by the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services as a measure of managed care penetration. We control for this effect through the 
variable MCO Penetration, which takes a value of 1 if the percentage of Medicare enrollees in 
the county exceed 15% and 0 otherwise (e.g. Baker, 2001). We tested for the robustness of our 
findings by using the alternative HMO penetration level information for the year 1998 obtained 
from the Area Resource File.  While the standard error for the MCO penetration estimate was 
larger, the magnitude and significance levels of our hypothesized covariates remain almost 
unchanged. 
Finally, we include state fixed effects to control for unobserved differences in health care 
regulation (e.g., certificate of need) across the different states (Hillman and Schwartz, 1985). 
Table 1 provides a brief summary of the variables used in the analysis. 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
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Analysis 
Many hospitals in our sample did not invest in the medical imaging technologies during 
the period of observation. Hence, our data is right-censored. Consistent with prior studies 
examining the firm’s timing of strategic investments in new technologies (e.g., Baker, 2001; 
Mitchell, 1989), we used hazard rate models to test our predictions. Specifically, we used the 
Cox semiparametric proportional hazards model, which allows for a fully flexible, nonparametric 
baseline hazard, and hence does not require making additional assumptions about the shape of 
the baseline hazard over time (Cox, 1975).   
In addition, a number of hospitals in our sample had invested in the MRI technologies 
prior to the first available observation in our dataset, and hence these observations were left-
censored. We follow the standard approach in the literature to exclude the observations that were 
left-censored (Allison, 1982). To ensure that our results are not biased by the exclusion of these 
observations, we separately estimated the effects of our covariates on the left-censored 
observations using the probit model. The results from the probit model, reported in the 
robustness tests section, are nearly identical to the results obtained from the Cox models. 
 
RESULTS 
Table 2 shows the summary statistics and correlations between our covariates. Table 3 
reports the results from the Cox models for the two different medical imaging technologies. 
Models 1 and 4 are our baseline models for the hospitals’ adoption of PET and MRI 
technologies, respectively. Models 2 and 3 allow us to test our predictions using data from 
hospitals’ adoption of PET technology, and Models 5 and 6 allow us to test our predictions using 
data from hospitals’ adoption of MRI technology.  
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----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
 
The results from the baseline models are consistent with our expectations and prior 
research in the health care industry (e.g., Baker and Phibbs, 2002; Hillman and Schwartz, 1985; 
Robinson, 1996; Teplensky et al., 1995). On the one hand, hospitals that are large, are not-for-
profit, are members of a medical school association, and have greater capacity utilization are 
more likely to invest in the new medical imaging technologies. On the other hand, hospitals that 
have a greater outpatient ratio and are located in more concentrated markets are less likely to 
invest in the new technologies. The estimates for MCO penetration are negative and significant 
for both PET and MRI technologies. Hence, our results provide continued support of prior 
findings that the emergence of MCOs is negatively correlated with hospitals’ investments in new 
technologies (Baker and Phibbs, 2002; Baker, 2001; Mas and Seinfeld, 2008). The coefficient for 
the number of hospitals is negative but insignificant.   
While we expected hospitals that are members of a teaching school association to be 
more likely to invest in the new technology, we found this effect to be positive and significant 
only for the PET technology. The significant and negative effect for MRI technology could be 
due to the fact that many of these hospitals that had invested in the MRI technology were left-
censored and hence excluded from the sample. This was confirmed in our estimates from the 
probit model using the left-censored data. Finally, the coefficient for Not-for-Profit was negative 
and significant for MRI technology only.8 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
                                                            
8 We note that studies in the health care industry have generally found mixed results with respect to differences in 
technology investments between for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals (e.g., Mas and Seinfeld, 2008). 
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In Hypothesis 1, we predicted that firms that have an alliance relationship with their 
complementors will be more likely to invest in a new technology than firms that have an arm’s-
length relationship. This prediction was supported for both technologies (Models 2 and 5). Note 
that our baseline category is the arm’s-length relationship between the hospitals and the 
physicians.  The coefficients for complementor alliance are significant and positive for both PET 
and MRI technologies. In considering the magnitude of estimated coefficients, we see that 
hospitals that have an alliance relationship with physicians are 32% (33%) more likely to invest 
in the PET (MRI technology) than hospitals that have an arm’s-length relationship with 
physicians.  
In Hypothesis 2, we predicted that firms that have an alliance relationship with their 
complementors will be more likely to invest in a new technology than firms that integrate into 
the complementary activities. The coefficient for complementor integration is insignificant for 
both PET and MRI technologies. A comparison of the coefficients for complementor alliance 
with that for complementor integration using the Wald test (Table 4) reveals support for 
Hypothesis 2.  
In Hypothesis 3, we predicted that a firm’s propensity to invest in the new technology is 
increasing in the scope of the firm-complementor alliance. Consistent with our hypothesis, the 
coefficient of alliance scope in Table 4 is increasing in the scope of the alliance. With the 
exception of low alliance scope for the PET technology, all of the alliance scope coefficients are 
positive and significant. Hospitals with low alliance scope are 21% more likely to invest in the 
MRI technology than hospitals that have an arm’s-length relationship with physicians. Hospitals 
with medium alliance scope are 26% (27%) more likely to invest in the PET (MRI) technology 
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than hospitals that have an arm’s-length relationship with physicians.  Finally, hospitals with 
high alliance scope are 45% (65%) more likely to invest in the PET (MRI) technology than 
hospitals that have an arm’s-length relationship with physicians. A comparison of the 
coefficients for the low and high alliance scope using the Wald test supports Hypothesis 3 for 
both technologies. However, the difference between the coefficients for the medium and high 
alliance scope was significant only for MRI technology, and the difference between the 
coefficients for the low and medium alliance scope was insignificant for both PET and MRI 
technologies. 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
 
Finally, in Hypothesis 4, we predicted that firms pursuing tapered integration strategies 
downstream in their vertical chains are more likely to invest in new technology than firms 
pursuing market-based strategies. This prediction was supported for both technologies. The 
coefficient for buyer tapered integration is significant and positive for both PET and MRI 
technologies. Hospitals that use tapered integration strategies with MCOs are 15% (25%) more 
likely to invest in PET (MRI) technology than hospitals that use only arm’s-length relationships. 
 
Robustness Tests 
An important issue to consider with our analysis is the possibility of hospitals self 
selecting into the different governance modes that could potentially bias our estimates. In order 
to test the robustness of our results to this potential endogeneity bias, we used a matching 
estimator approach. Matching estimators have been widely used in economics and have recently 
been used by scholars in management to address selection bias in empirical specifications (e.g., 
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Gonzalez and Pazo, 2008; Rawley and Simcoe, 2009; Sampson, 2005; Zhao, 2009). This non-
parametric approach compares the statistical results obtained in a treatment group with those 
obtained in a comparable control group. The main purpose of the matching estimator is to try to 
reestablish the conditions of a natural experiment so that the comparison between the two groups 
allows for a causal inference (Abadie, Drukker et al., 2004). We use matching estimators to 
evaluate the effect of hospital-physician and hospital-MCO governance modes on the hospital’s 
propensity to invest in new imaging technologies. Our control group is drawn from the hospitals 
that maintained the same organizational form throughout the period of study. Our treatment 
group is drawn from the hospitals that shifted their organizational form. 
We briefly illustrate the specification that we use to estimate our results. Let i index the 
hospital in our sample, and let T be a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if hospital shifts 
its governance mode and 0 otherwise. Let Yi(T) represent the hospital’s decision to invest in the 
new technology. So Yi(0) represents the hospital’s decision to invest if it had maintained its 
governance mode, and Yi(1) represents the same hospital’s decision to invest if it had shifted its 
governance mode. Clearly, if both results were simultaneously observed, the effect of the 
hospital-physician and hospital-MCO governance choice for hospital i, Yi(1)−Yi(0), would be 
directly observable. The population average of this effect could be obtained as E[Y(1)−Y(0)], and 
its sample counterpart as (1/N)෌ ሾܻ݅ሺ1ሻ  െ  ܻ݅ሺ0ሻሿே
௜ୀଵ
, where N is the number of hospitals. 
However, Yi(1) and Yi(0) are not simultaneously observable. For example, in our study, we 
cannot observe the same hospital to shift from alliance to integration and maintain the alliance 
mode as well. In other words, the two events - shifting and maintaining the governance mode are 
mutually exclusive.   
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The matching estimators provide an alternative approach. Let j (while i≠j) index the 
hospitals in our sample, and assume that hospitals i and j closely match each other based on the 
observables. By observing Yi(0)and Yj(1), we can use Yj(1) as a counterfactual value of Yi(1). We 
use the bias-corrected nearest-neighbor matching estimator proposed by Abadie and Imbens 
(2006) to find the counterfactual value.9  For each hospital i, the standard nearest-neighbor 
matching estimator searches for the most similar hospital with the opposite treatment. We match 
hospitals based on hospital attributes, MCO penetration, market competition, and demand. 
Figures 4, 5, and 6 plot the kernel densities of the propensity scores for the unmatched and 
matched treatment and control groups. The effectiveness of our matching procedure is evident 
from greater similarity in kernel densities among the matched groups as compared to the 
unmatched groups. 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 4, 5, and 6 about here 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Our main results are supported if we find that the difference in the likelihood of 
investment between the treatment and the control groups is significant in our predicted direction. 
For example, with respect to Hypothesis 1, our control group comprises hospitals that use an 
alliance mode, and the matched treatment group comprises hospitals that shift from an alliance to 
an arm’s-length relationship with physicians. Hypothesis 1 is supported if we find that the 
hospitals in the treatment group are less likely to invest in the new imaging technology than 
similar hospitals in the control group. The results, reported in Table 5, are fully supportive of 
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 4. While we would have preferred to test the robustness of all hypotheses, 
                                                            
9 This was implemented in STATA 10.0 using the NNMATCH procedure provided by Abadie, Herr, et al. (2004).  
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we are limited by our data. Only a small number of hospitals have changed the scope of the 
alliance during the period of study, and hence we are unable to create robust control and 
treatment groups to test Hypothesis 3. 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
 
Another potential concern with our analysis is that in estimating the hospital’s likelihood 
of investment in MRI technology, we excluded a large number of hospitals who had adopted the 
technology prior to our window of observation. It is possible that the exclusion of these left-
censored observations may have created a selection bias in our sample. To ensure that our results 
for the MRI technology are not biased by the exclusion of these hospitals, we performed a cross-
sectional analysis using a probit model for the year 1995, the first year of observation in the 
study. The estimated results from the probit model, reported in Table 6, are nearly identical to 
the results from the Cox models and provide additional support for our predictions. 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
 
DISCUSSION 
The organization of activities within and outside firm boundaries has long been of 
interest to scholars in economics and strategic management. Scholars have shed light on a variety 
of organizational forms that firms use to manage interdependent activities, being explicit about 
the tradeoffs associated with the different governance modes (e.g., Dyer and Singh, 1998; 
Harrigan, 1986; Hennart, 1993; Mahoney, 1992; Williamson, 1991a). This study contributes to 
that literature by examining the relationship between firms’ governance choices and an important 
type of strategic behavior — i.e., investments in new technologies. We expand the analysis of 
29 
 
organizational forms from the literature’s focus on the upstream and downstream activities in the 
firm’s vertical chain to also consider complements that are a vital part of the firm’s business 
ecosystem (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1998; Teece, 2007). Our central premise is that by 
facilitating the coordination of changes that underlie the commercialization of new technology 
and by enhancing the firm’s strategic position with respect to other players in its ecosystem, a 
firm’s organizational form plays an important role in creating and capturing value from 
investments in new technology.   
We test our arguments in the context of the U.S. health care industry from 1995 to 2006. 
We explore how hospitals’ investments in new imaging technologies are shaped by their mode of 
governance with physicians—key complementors to hospitals—and with MCOs—primary 
distributors of hospital and physician services. We find that hospitals that pursue alliances with 
physicians are more likely to invest in new imaging technologies than hospitals that either have 
an arm’s-length relationship with physicians or are integrated and employ their own physicians. 
We also find that among hospitals pursuing alliances with physicians, the likelihood of 
investments in new imaging technologies is increasing in the scope of the alliance. Finally, we 
find that hospitals that pursue tapered integration strategies with MCOs such that they use both 
hierarchy- and market-based governance modes are more likely to invest in new imaging 
technologies than hospitals that use only market-based governance. 
The study contributes to some important issues in the strategy literature. While a vast 
body of empirical literature has explored the determinants and performance implications of firm 
boundaries and governance modes, the literature has been surprisingly silent on how such 
governance choices affect strategic behavior, an important precursor to firm performance within 
its competitive environment. We hope that our results would encourage scholars to integrate their 
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examination of coordination among interdependent activities with that of competition among 
rivals and other players in the ecosystem so as to improve our understanding of firm strategies 
and competitive advantage.  
We believe that ours is the first study in the strategy literature that has explicitly 
considered complements in examining different types of organizational forms and their strategic 
implications for focal firms. In contrast to the predominant supply-side efficiency considerations 
that are made with respect to firms’ governance modes, the analysis of complements allows for 
the inclusion of demand side benefits that firms may enjoy by coordinating complementary 
activities and enhancing the value of their focal products or services.  
An interesting result of the study was the inverted U-shaped relationship that we 
observed with respect to the hospital-physician governance choices along the market-hierarchy 
continuum and the likelihood of technology investment. Hospitals pursuing alliances with 
physicians were more likely to invest in new imaging technologies than hospitals pursuing either 
arm’s-length or integrated modes. While scholars have emphasized the tradeoffs that exist 
between market- and hierarchy-based organizational forms (Dyer, Kale, and Singh, 2004; 
Gibbons, 2005; Williamson, 1991a), our results support the conjecture that the hybrid alliance 
form may provide a more balanced mode of organization that allows for coordination while 
preserving incentives. This result also supports call for empirical research on firm boundaries to 
consider a broader set of governance modes (e.g., Villalonga and McGahan, 2005) in order to 
better understand the tradeoffs associated with each of the organizational forms.   
The literature on strategic alliances has provided useful dimensions to help characterize 
the different types of alliances. Among them, the scope of the alliance between alliance partners 
has been widely recognized to be an important “design” choice (e.g., Doz and Hamel, 1998; 
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Khanna et al., 1998). Our results reinforce the need to consider the variance in alliance scope 
rather than the existence of the alliance per se. Moreover, alliances between complementors are 
becoming increasingly prevalent and we hope that our study would encourage scholars 
examining firms’ alliance portfolios to explicitly consider alliance between complementors as 
part of the firms’ alliance strategies.  
Finally, our findings contribute to the understanding of technology adoption in the 
context of business ecosystems. We add to the factors considered by the adoption literature (e.g., 
Geroski, 2000; Griliches, 1957; Rogers, 1995) by suggesting that the distribution of 
organizational forms in a given industry would play an important role in explaining the pattern of 
new technology adoption. For example, the relative distribution of hospitals that have an alliance 
relationship with physicians would affect the pace with which hospitals adopt new imaging 
technologies.  Scholars examining patterns of technology adoption could benefit from an explicit 
consideration of heterogeneity in organizational forms in explaining the rate of technology 
adoption. The consistency in the results among the two technologies in which we examined the 
adoption patterns of different types of adopters (Rogers, 1995) - innovators and early adopters in 
the case of PET technology and majority adopters in the case of MRI technology, provide further 
evidence that our theorized mechanisms are likely to be independent of some of the dominant 
explanations in the adoption literature. 
While we have taken care in this examination, the study of course has a number of 
limitations. It is conducted in the context of a single industry and we are unable to establish the 
generalizability of our findings across different settings. It will be of interest to see whether our 
results can be replicated in other contexts and what boundary conditions may be needed to 
extend the generalizability of our findings. Our focus on medical imaging technologies, while 
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allowing for an examination of a significant technology investment by hospitals, precludes us 
from making generic assertions on all forms of technology investments. For example, our 
predictions are based on a key premise that the successful commercialization of technologies 
requires coordinated changes between focal firms and complementors. It is possible that certain 
technological investments may not have a direct bearing on complementary activities and 
therefore, will be outside the scope of our predictions. Another important caveat of this study is 
that we are not implying a correspondence between a firm’s technology investment and its 
performance outcome. We are merely suggesting a correspondence between a firm’s 
organizational form and its propensity to invest in new technologies. Hence, we make no claims 
that in our context, alliances are a superior form of governance.  Finally, while we have 
attempted to address the endogeneity bias that may exist due to hospital’s self-selection into the 
different governance modes through additional robustness tests, we cannot fully address this 
possibility.  
In conclusion, the study situates a firm in the context of its business ecosystem 
encompassing interdependent activities and value chains. It explores how organizational choices 
- arm’s-length contracting, alliance or ownership, with respect to complementary activities and 
downstream distribution affect the firms’ investments into new technologies. We contribute to 
the literature on firm boundaries by considering how boundary choices and governance modes 
shape firm behavior within the competitive environment. We also move beyond the literature’s 
focus on upstream inputs and downstream distribution to also consider complements that form an 
important part of the firm’s business environment. We hope that our results would encourage 
scholars to extend research on firm boundary and governance choices to explore the link between 
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coordination mechanisms and competitive behavior, and to consider such choices in the context 
of the business ecosystems. 
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Figure 1: An integrative framework linking firm-complementor organizational form and 
the firm’s likelihood of investment in a new technology 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Simplified schema of the health care delivery ecosystema 
 
a Lines indicate service contracts and arrows indicate the flow of services in return for payments (patient co-
payments, though present from end-users to physicians and hospitals, are not considered here, as they are a 
significantly small proportion of the total payment. 
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Figure 3: Percentage of hospitals that have invested in PET and MRI imaging technologies  
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Figure 4: Propensity score of treatment (arm’s-length) and control (alliance) groups before and after 
matching 
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Figure 5: Propensity score of treatment (integrated) and control (alliance) groups before and 
after matching 
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Figure 6: Propensity score of treatment (MCO tapered integration) and control (arm’s-
length) groups before and after matching 
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Table 1: Description of variables 
Variables Description 
Dependent Variable 
Hospital’s Technology Investment Dummy=1 for the year the hospital invested in the technology 
Independent Variables 
Complementor Alliance Dummy=1 for the hospitals that have an alliance relationship with physicians 
Low Alliance Scope Dummy=1 for the hospitals that use IPA alliance form 
Medium Alliance Scope Dummy=1 for the hospitals that use OPHO alliance form. 
High Alliance Scope Dummy=1 for the hospitals that use CPHO and MSO alliance forms 
Complementor Integration Dummy=1 for the hospitals that have an integrated salary model and employ physicians 
Buyer (MCO) Tapered Integration Dummy=1 for the hospitals that have an equity relationship with an MCO 
Control Variables 
Hospital Effects 
Hospital Size Number of beds in the hospitals 
Medical School Affiliation Dummy=1 for the hospitals that are members of medical school association 
Teaching School Member Dummy=1 for the hospitals that are affiliated with teaching school association 
Not-for-Profit Dummy=1 for the hospitals that are owned by not-for-profit institutions  
Government Owned Dummy=1 for the hospitals that are owned by the government 
Outpatient Ratio The ratio of total number of annual outpatient visits and the total annual number of inpatient visits for a given hospital. 
Capacity Utilization The ratio of hospital’s total inpatient days over the number of beds multiplied by 365 
Competitive Effects 
Market Concentration HHI index based on hospital’s share of beds in  a given county 
Number of Hospitals Number of general hospitals in a given county 
MCO Effect 
MCO Penetration Dummy=1 if Medicare managed care penetration is greater than 15%  
Demand Effects 
Unemployment Rate Unemployment rate in % for those 16 years and older in a given county 
Per Capita Income Per capita income of the county in 0000s 
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Table 2: Correlation matrix 
 
  
   Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1 Low Alliance Scope 0.086 0.280 1                                 
2 Medium Alliance Scope 0.091 0.288 -0.10 1                               
3 High Alliance Scope 0.055 0.229 -0.07 -0.08 1                             
4 Complementor Integration 0.187 0.390 -0.15 -0.15 -0.12 1                           
5 Buyer(MCO) Tapered Integration 0.097 0.296 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.02 1                         
6 Hospital Size 137.66 152.23 -0.02 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.05 1                       
7 Medical School Affiliation 0.239 0.426 -0.02 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.35 1                     
8 Teaching School Member 0.037 0.188 -0.02 -0.02 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.36 0.34 1                   
9 Not-for-Profit 0.511 0.500 -0.01 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.09 0.01 1                 
10 Government Owned 0.313 0.464 -0.02 -0.09 -0.03 0.11 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.05 -0.69 1               
11 Market Concentration 0.516 0.361 -0.02 0.00 -0.04 0.03 0.02 -0.32 -0.24 -0.19 -0.03 0.22 1             
12 # of hospitals 6.963 14.450 0.09 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.17 0.13 0.10 0.00 -0.13 -0.48 1           
13 MCO Penetration (>15%) 0.319 0.466 0.05 -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.11 0.06 0.08 0.02 -0.09 -0.32 0.33 1         
14 Outpatient Ratio 25.876 51.586 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.00 1       
15 Capacity Utilization 0.576 0.501 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.15 0.07 0.06 0.02 -0.03 -0.14 0.07 0.05 0.00 1     
16 Unemployment Rate 0.053 0.024 0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 0.04 -0.06 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 0.04 0.07 0.04 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 1   
17 Per Capita Income 24846.6 7979.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.04 -0.06 0.20 0.11 0.14 0.10 -0.18 -0.46 0.23 0.23 0.00 0.10 -0.24 1 
Correlations greater than .01 or smaller than -.01 are significant at p <.5, N= 37382
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Table 3: Cox proportional hazards estimates for a hospital’s investment into new imaging 
technology 
 
 PET Technology MRI Technology 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Complementor Alliance (H1)   0.228***     0.286***   
    (0.066)     (0.048)   
Low Alliance Scope     0.086     0.193*** 
      (0.105)     (0.069) 
Medium Alliance Scope     0.234**     0.239*** 
      (0.091)     (0.069) 
High Alliance Scope     0.370***     0.501*** 
      (0.102)     (0.077) 
Complementor Integration   0.042 0.043   -0.053 -0.052 
    (0.079) (0.079)   (0.064) (0.064) 
Buyer Tapered Integration (H4)   0.148* 0.152*   0.227*** 0.234*** 
    (0.087) (0.087)   (0.064) (0.064) 
Hospital Size 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
  0.000  (0.000) 0.000  0.000  (0.000) 0.000  
Medical School Affiliation 0.287*** 0.288*** 0.279*** 0.426*** 0.444*** 0.442*** 
  (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) 
Teaching School Member 0.294*** 0.298*** 0.296*** -0.213* -0.240** -0.249** 
  (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) 
Not-for-Profit 0.123 0.118 0.114 -0.158** -0.169*** -0.166*** 
  (0.090) (0.090) (0.091) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) 
Government Owned -0.268** -0.253** -0.254** -0.534*** -0.519*** -0.512*** 
  (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) 
Market Competition -0.659*** -0.679*** -0.666*** -0.407*** -0.403*** -0.400*** 
  (0.120) (0.120) (0.120) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) 
# of hospitals -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
MCO Penetration (>15%) -0.132* -0.120* -0.122* -0.146*** -0.140*** -0.140*** 
  (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
Outpatient Ratio -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Capacity Utilization 0.0472** 0.0480** 0.0480** -0.0229 -0.0147 -0.016 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.074) (0.072) (0.072) 
Unemployment Rate -0.064*** -0.067*** -0.065*** -0.043*** -0.044*** -0.043*** 
  (0.017) (0.000) (0.017) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
 Per Capita Income  -0.076** -0.087** -0.081** -0.234*** -0.234*** -0.242*** 
  (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Hospitals 5367 5367 5367 3947 3947 3947 
Observations 36833 36828 36828 18919 18916 18916 
Log Likelihood -10117 -10109 -10106 -17742 -17704 -17699 
 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Our baseline category of hospital-physician governance mode is the arm’s-length relationship.
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Table 4: Difference between coefficients estimates using Wald test 
 
PET 
Technology Null Hypothesis Chi
2(2) Prob > Chi2 
H2 Complementor Alliance = Complementor Integration 4.76 0.029 
H3 Low Alliance Scope = High Alliance Scope 4.50 0.034 
       
MRI 
Technology Null Hypothesis Chi
2(2) Prob > Chi2 
H2 Complementor Alliance = Complementor Integration 24.94 0.000 
H3 Low Alliance Scope = High Alliance Scope 10.52 0.001 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Sample average treatment effect for hospital’s investment in the PET technology 
 
Hypothesis Predicted Sign Coefficient
a Hospitals in 
Treatment Group 
H1 (Complementor Alliance vs. 
Arm’s-Length) -ve 
-0.068** 
(0.039) 
144  
(Alliance to Arm’s-
Length) 
H2 (Complementor Alliance vs. 
Integration) -ve 
-0.062** 
(0.036) 
306 
(Alliance to 
Integration) 
H4 (Buyer Tapered Integration 
vs. Arm’s-Length) +ve 
0.064** 
(0.031) 
271  
(Arm’s-length to 
Tapered Integration) 
   
a Sample average treatment effect for the treatment group 
 *Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: Probit estimates for a hospital’s investment in MRI technology in 1995 
 
 Model 7 Model 8 
Complementor Alliance 0.351***   
  (0.058)   
Low Alliance Scope   0.132 
    (0.089) 
Medium Alliance Scope   0.436*** 
    (0.082) 
High Alliance Scope   0.518*** 
    (0.100) 
Complementor Integration -0.160* -0.156* 
  (0.085) (0.085) 
Buyer (MCO) Tapered Integration 0.171** 0.160** 
  (0.067) (0.067) 
Hospital Size 0.00242*** 0.00239*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Medical School Affiliation 0.174** 0.167** 
  (0.085) (0.085) 
Teaching School Member 0.0273 0.0329 
  (0.132) (0.133) 
Not-for-Profit -0.117 -0.121 
  (0.088) (0.088) 
Government Owned -0.502*** -0.500*** 
  (0.094) (0.094) 
Market Competition -0.282*** -0.277*** 
  (0.101) (0.102) 
# of hospitals -0.00781*** -0.00722*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) 
MCO Penetration (>15%) 0.00223 0.00769 
  (0.096) (0.097) 
Outpatient Ratio -0.00661*** -0.00688*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) 
Capacity Utilization 0.164 0.142 
  (0.154) (0.154) 
Unemployment Rate -0.0412*** -0.0423*** 
  (0.013) (0.013) 
 Per Capita Income  0.0889 0.0747 
  (0.069) (0.070) 
State Dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 3298 3298 
R2 0.1968 0.1994 
Log Likelihood -1747.1747 -1741.4927 
 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
